It is important for applications to protect sensitive data. Even for simple confidentiality and integrity policies, it is often difficult for programmers to reason about how the policies should interact and how to enforce policies across the program. A promising approach is policy-agnostic programming, a model that allows the programmer to implement policies separately from core functionality. Yang et al. describe Jeeves [48], a programming language that supports information flow policies describing how to reveal sensitive values in different output channels. Jeeves uses symbolic evaluation and constraint-solving to produce outputs adhering to the policies. This strategy provides strong confidentiality guarantees but limits expressiveness and implementation feasibility.
Introduction
It is increasingly important for applications to protect user privacy. Even for simple confidentiality and integrity policies, it is often difficult for programmers to reason about how the policies should interact and how to enforce policies across the program.
Policy-agnostic programming has the goal of allowing the programmer to implement core functionality separately from privacy policies. The programmer specifies policies as declarative rules and relies on the system to produce outputs adhering to the policies. Yang et al. describe Jeeves [48] , a language that supports Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. PLAS '13, June 20, 2013 , Seattle, WA, USA. Copyright c 2013 ACM 978-1-4503-2144-0/13/06. . . $15.00 confidentiality policies describing how to reveal views of sensitive values based on the output channel. Sensitive values are pairs ℓ ? vH : vL , where vH is the high-confidentiality value, vL is the low-confidentiality value, and guard ℓ is a label. The initial implementation of Jeeves relies on symbolic evaluation and constraintsolving to produce outputs adhering to the policies. This strategy provides strong confidentiality guarantees, but at the cost of expressiveness and implementation feasibility. For instance, this implementation restricts recursion under symbolic conditionals and requires the cumulative constraint environment to persist.
In this paper, we present a faceted semantics for Jeeves that exploits the structure of sensitive values in order to increase expressiveness, facilitate reasoning about runtime behavior, and automatically enforce confidentiality policies. We base the Jeeves evaluation strategy on Austin et al.'s faceted execution [6] , which manipulates explicit representations of sensitive values. With this strategy, labels variables are the only symbolic variables, allowing Jeeves to lift restrictions on the flow of sensitive values. To further improve ease of reasoning, Jeeves allows policies to only constrain labels to low. This guarantees that the constraint environment is always consistent, a property that allows for policy garbage-collection.
In this paper we make the following contributions:
• We present a faceted evaluation semantics for Jeeves, a language for automatically enforcing confidentiality policies. The execution model exploits the structure of sensitive values in order to increase expressiveness and to facilitate reasoning about runtime behavior.
• We present a dynamic semantics for faceted execution of Jeeves in terms of the λ jeeves core language. We prove terminationinsensitive non-interference, and policy compliance. We show that it is possible to reason about termination, policy consistency, and policy independence: properties that were not possible to reason about with the original semantics of Jeeves [48] .
• We describe our implementation of Jeeves as an embedded domain-specific language in Scala and our experience using Jeeves to implement a conference management system that interacts with a web-based frontend and a persistent database.
Jeeves and Faceted Evaluation
We introduce faceted values into Jeeves in order to provide confidentiality guarantees, and compare its design with systems that rely on a declassification primitive and with the symbolic execution strategy used in an earlier implementation of Jeeves.
In this section, we present Jeeves using an ML-like concrete syntax, shown in Figure 1 . Jeeves extends the λ-calculus with refer-Producing concrete outputs involves finding assignments to labels that satisfy the policies. The Jeeves system tries to assign labels to high, setting labels to low only if the policies require it. Assigning all labels to low always yields a consistent solution.
Jeeves allows the output channel to be sensitive: There is a circular dependency: the context u is a sensitive value <b ? alice : nobody> guarded by a policy depending on the context. Such a policy allows two outcomes: b is high and we display alice .name to user alice and b is low and we display nobody.name to user nobody. The Jeeves runtime ensures maximal functionality: if the policies allow a labels to be high or low, the value will be high.
A Health Database in Jeeves
To show how to use Jeeves for real-world applications, let us build a simple health database with records of the following form: This context contains information not just for the viewer but also for the current date, allowing policies to define activation and expiration times for visibility.
The idiomatic way of attaching policies to a value is to create sensitive values for each field and then attach policies: let mkPatient ( identity : User) (doctor : User) ( meds: Medication list ) : Patient = label np, dp, mp in let p = { identity = <np ? identity : nobody> ; doctor = <dp ? doctor : nobody> ; meds = <mp ? meds : []> in addNamePolicy p np; addDoctorPolicy p dp; addMedicationsPolicy p mp; in p This function introduces labels, creates sensitive values, attaches policies to the labels, and returns the resulting Patient record. The function makes use of the add ... Policy functions for attaching policies to the labels. The add ... Policy functions take a Patient record and a labels and uses the record fields to attach a policy to the label. We define addMedicationsPolicy as: This policy sets the label to low unless the viewer is the patient or the patient's doctor. Jeeves automatically handles dependencies between policies and sensitive values: to have access to the medication list, the viewer needs to be able to see that their identity is equal to either p. identity or p.doctor.
Comparison to Declassification
Declassification primitives are used in many systems that make information flow guarantees. For instance, in an auction system the last bid might be considered private information until the auction has been completed, at which point the final bid should be made public. In a system with a declassification primitive instead of support for policy-agnostic programming, the relevant code to allow the release of this data might look something like the following: At each print statement involving the final bid, the above code would need to be repeated. These declassification statements refine the core policy. The original paper on faceted values [6] shows how a declassification primitive may be designed for faceted evaluation.
The downside with this approach is that the effective policy for the system is littered throughout the code, leading to obvious x variables ℓ labels p, r primitives, records Label ::= low | high labels problems with the readability and maintainability of the policyrelated code. In aspect-oriented [25] terminology, this approach suffers from a tangling of aspects. While declassification can provide the flexibility needed in realworld systems, we argue that policy-agnostic programming is a more elegant solution. Since the policy code is kept separately, it is easier to get a holistic picture of the policy for data in the system, resulting in improved readability and maintainability. Also, since policy code can be kept separate, it might potentially be easier to protect policy mechanisms from abuse by malicious third parties than it would be to protect the use of a declassification primitive.
Continuing with the auction example, the policy code for the final bid is shown below. No matter how many channels we write to with the print statement, we do not need to repeat the policy code that determines if the value of finalBid can be released. As an additional benefit, we note that policy-agnostic programming offers a good solution for approaches such as secure multiexecution [17] that rely on separate processes. Since policy code is only applied when data is released, it eliminates the need for coordinating between processes (assuming that the policy is consistent).
Advantages of Faceted Execution over Symbolic Execution
Explicit representation of facets allows the runtime to prune branches of execution. Consider the following function, which takes a list of patients and a doctor and calls fold to count of the number of patients with a doctor field matching the doctor argument, on the records in Table 1 with doctor = erica.
Consider the behavior of this function on the records in Table 1 with a call to countPatients with doctor = erica. Evaluation of <e ? erica : default > = = erica yields the expression <e ? erica = = erica : default = = erica>, which can be simplified to <e ? true : false >. Evaluation of faceted function applications creates a new faceted value resulting from applying the function to each facet. If e is in the set of path condition assumptions, then only the high facet is used. Evaluation of the conditional produces the expression <e ? if (true) then (accum + 1) else accum : if ( false ) ... >, which simplifies to <e ? accum + 1 : accum>. Depending on whether the output user is allowed to see that p.doctor is equal to erica , the resulting sum is either accum or accum + 1.
Storing an explicit representation for facets allows the runtime to prune branches. For instance, if the doctor is not equal to erica on either facet, then the faceted evaluation only needs to store a single value. The system may also prune facets based on path assumptions: if evaluation is occurring under the assumption that guard k is true, then subsequent evaluation can assume guard k. This is particularly advantageous when there are a small number of labels corresponding to a fixed set of principals.
Core Semantics
We model the semantics of Jeeves with λ jeeves , a simple core language that extends the faceted execution semantics of Austin and Flanagan [6] with a declarative policy language for confidentiality. The λ jeeves semantics describes how to evaluate faceted values, store policies, and use the policy environment to provide assignments to labels for producing concrete outputs. We use these semantics to prove non-interference and policy compliance guarantees.
We show the source syntax in Figure 2 . The language λ jeeves extends the λ-calculus with expressions for allocating references (ref e), dereferencing (!e), assignment (e1:= e2), creating faceted Syntax:
application ref e
reference allocation !e dereference e:= e assignment k ? e1 : e2 faceted expression label k in e label declaration restrict(k, e) policy specification
Standard encodings: The source language λ jeeves expressions ( k ? e1 : e2 ), specifying policy (restrict(k, e)), and declaring labels (label k in e). Additional statements exist for letstatements (let x = e in S) and printing output (print {e1} e2). Conditionals are encoded in terms of function application.
In λ jeeves , values V contain faceted values of the form
A viewer authorized to see k-sensitive data will observe the private facet VH. Other viewers will instead see VL. For example, the value k ? 42 : 0 specifies a value of 42 that should only be viewed when k is high according to the policy associated with k. When the policy specifies low, the observed value should instead be 0.
A program counter label pc records when execution is influenced by public or private facets. For instance, in the conditional test if ( k ? true : false ) then e1 else e2 our semantics needs to evaluate both e1 and e2. The label k is added to pc during the evaluation of e1. By doing so, our semantics records the influence of k on this computation. Similarly, k is added to pc during the evaluation of e2 to record that the execution should have no effects observable to k. A branch h is either a label k or its negation k. Therefore pc is a set of branches that never contains both k and k, since that would reflect influences from both the private and public facet of a value.
The operation pc ? V1 : V2 creates a faceted value. The value V1 is visible when the specified policies correspond with all branches in pc. Otherwise, V2 is visible instead.
For example, {k, l} ? VH : VL returns k ? l ? VH : VL : VL . We occasionally abbreviate {k} ? VH : VL as k ? VH : VL . The semantics are defined via the big-step evaluation relation:
This relation evaluates an expression e in the context of a store Σ and program counter label pc. It returns a modified store Σ ′ reflecting updates and a value V . In Figure 3 we show the evaluation rules, which uses additional runtime syntax (also shown in Figure 3 ).
Our language includes support for reference cells, which introduce additional complexities in handling implicit flows. The rule [F-REF] handles reference allocation (ref e). It evaluates an expression e, encoding any influences from the program counter pc to the value V , and adds it to the store Σ ′ at a fresh address a. Facets in V inconsistent with pc are set to 0. (Critically, to maintain noninterference, Σ(a) = 0 for all a not in the domain of Σ.)
The rule [F-DEREF] for dereferencing (!e) evaluates the expression e to a value V , which should either be an address or a faceted values where all of the "leaves" are addresses. The rule uses a helper function deref (Σ ′ , V, pc) (defined in Figure 3 ), which takes the addresses from V , retrieves the appropriate values from the store Σ ′ , and combines them in the return value V ′ . As an optimization, addresses that are not compatible with pc are ignored.
The rule [F-ASSIGN] for assignment (e1:= e2) is similar to [F-DEREF] . It evaluates e1 to a possibly faceted value V1 corresponding to an address and e2 to a value V ′ . The helper function assignOp(Σ2, pc, V1, V ′ ) defined in Figure 3 decomposes V1 into separate addresses, storing the appropriate facets of V ′ into the returned store Σ ′ . The changes to the store may come from both V1 and pc.
The rule [F-LABEL] dynamically allocates a label (label k in e), adding a fresh label to the store with the default policy of λx.true. Any occurrences of k in e are α-renamed to k ′ and the expression is evaluated with the updated store. Policies may be further refined (restrict(k, e)) by the rule [F-RESTRICT] , which evaluates e to a policy V that should be either a lambda or a faceted value comprised of lambdas. The additional policy check is restricted by pc, so that policy checks cannot themselves leak data. It is then joined with the existing policy for k, ensuring that policies can only become more restrictive.
When a faceted expression k ? e1 : e2 is evaluated, both sub-expressions must be evaluated in sequence, as per the rule [F-SPLIT] . The influence of k is added to the program counter for the evaluation of e1 to V1 and k for the evaluation of e2 to V2, tracking the branch of code being taken. The results of both evaluations are joined together in the operation k ? V1 : V2 . As an optimization, only one expression is evaluated if the program counter already contains either k or k, as indicated by the rules [F-LEFT] and [F-RIGHT] .
Function application (e1 e2) is somewhat complex in the presence of faceted values. The rule [F-APP] evaluates e1 to V1, which should either be a lambda or a faceted value containing lambdas, and evaluates e2 to the function argument V2. It then delegates the application (V1 V2) to an auxiliary relation defined in Figure 4 : While expressions handle most of the complexity of faceted values, statements in λ jeeves illustrate how faceted values may be concretized when exporting data to an external party. The semantics for statements are defined via the big-step evaluation relation:
Semantics for Derived Encodings
The rules for statements are specified in Figure 4 . The rule [F-LET] handles let expressions (let x = e in S), evaluating an expression e to a value V , performing the proper substitution in statement S. The rule [F-PRINT] handles print statements (print {e1} e2), where the result of evaluating e2 is printed to the channel resulting from the evaluation of e1. Both the channel V f and the value to print Vc may be faceted values, and furthermore, we must select the facets that correspond with our specified policies. The expression ep contains all relevant policies included in the store Σ2. It is evaluated and applied to V f , returning the policy check Vp that is a faceted value containing booleans. A program counter pc is chosen such that the policies are satisfied, which determines the channel f and the value to print R. Note that there exists a pc ′ ∈ PC where all branches are set to low, which may always be displayed, thereby ensuring that there is always at least one valid choice for pc.
This property allows garbage collection of policies and facets. Because the constraints are always consistent, the only set of policies relevant to an expression e to output are associated with the transitive closure of labels Le appearing in e and the policies associated with Le. Thus any policy associated with an out-of-scope variable may be garbaged-collected. In addition, once a policy has been set to the equivalent of λx.false for a label k, k-sensitive facets and policies cannot be used in a print statement. These properties are advantages over the previous symbolic-execution strategy used by an earlier implementation of Jeeves [48] , since the earlier approach could introduce inconsistent policies.
Properties
We prove that a single execution with faceted values is equivalent to multiple different executions without faceted values. From this we know that if execution terminates on each facet of a sensitive value, then faceted execution terminates. Jeeves does not have this property because execution keeps sensitive values as symbolic; thus Jeeves restricts applications of recursive functions.
We also prove that the system cannot leak sensitive information either via the output or by the choice of output channel.
Projection Theorem
A key property of faceted evaluation is that it simulates multiple executions. In other words, a single execution with faceted values projects to multiple different executions without faceted values.
pc : Expr (with facets) → Expr (with fewer facets)
We extend pc to project faceted stores Σ ∈ Store into stores with fewer facets.
pc :
Thus pc projection does not remove policies, it only removes some labels on expressions or values. We say that pc 1 and pc 2 are consistent if
We note some key lemmas regarding projection.
Lemma 1. If
V = pc ? V1 : V2 then ∀q ∈ PC q(V ) = pc \ q ? q(V1) : q(V2) if q is consistent with pc q(V2) otherwise Lemma 2. If V ′ = deref (Σ, V, pc) then ∀q ∈ PC where q is consistent with pc, q(V ′ ) = deref (q(Σ), q(V ), pc \ q). Lemma 3. If Σ ′ = assign(Σ, pc, V1, V2) then ∀q ∈ PC q(Σ ′ ) =    assign(q(Σ), pc \ q, q(V1), q(V2)) if q consistent with pc q(Σ) otherwise
Lemma 4. Suppose pc and q are not consistent and that either
The following projection theorem shows how a single faceted evaluation simulates (or projects) to multiple executions, each with fewer facets, or possibly with no facets at all (if for each label k in the program, either k or k is in q).
Theorem 1 (Projection Theorem). Suppose
Then for any q ∈ PC where pc and q are consistent
This theorem significantly extends the projection property of Austin and Flanagan [6] , in that it supports dynamic label allocation and flexible, dynamically specified policies, and is also more general in that it can either remove none, some, or all top-level labels in a program, depending on the choice of the projection PC q. A full proof of the projection theorem is available in the appendix.
Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference
The projection property captures that data from one collection of executions, represented by the corresponding set of branches pc, does not leak into any incompatible views, thus enabling a straightforward proof of non-interference.
Two faceted values are pc-equivalent if they have identical values for the set of branches pc. This notion of pc-equivalence naturally extends to stores (Σ1 ∼pc Σ2) and expressions (e1 ∼pc e2):
The notion of pc-equivalence and the projection theorem enable a concise statement and proof of termination-insensitive noninterference.
Theorem 2 (Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference).
Let pc be any set of branches. Suppose Σ1 ∼pc Σ2 and e1 ∼pc e2, and that:
Proof. By the Projection Theorem:
The pc-equivalence assumptions imply that pc(Σ1) = pc(Σ2) and pc(e1) = pc(e2). Hence pc(Σ ′ 1 ) = pc(Σ ′ 2 ) and pc(V1) = pc(V2) since the semantics is deterministic.
Termination-Insensitive Policy Compliance
While we have shown non-interference for a set of labels, the labels do not directly correspond to the output revealed to a given observer. In this section we show how we can prove termination-insensitive policy compliance; data is revealed to an external observer only if it is allowed by the policy specified in the program. Thus if S1 and S2 are terminating programs that differ only in k-labeled components and the computed policy Vi for each program does not permit revealing k-sensitive data to the output channel, then the set of possible outputs from each program is identical. Here, an output f : v combines both the output channel f and the value v, to ensure that sensitive information is not leaked either via the output value or by the choice of output channel. 
Proof. We show left-to-right containment as follows. (The converse containment holds by a similar argument.) Suppose
Also by the [F-PRINT] rule for the second execution
Hence by the projection theorem
Pick pc 2 = pc 1 . Then R2 = R1 and f2 = f1 as required.
Scala Implementation
We have implemented Jeeves as an embedded domain-specific language in the Scala programming language [37] . We use Scala's overloading capabilities to implement faceted execution, constraint collection, and interaction with the Z3 SMT solver [33] . 1 The implementation defines Scala classes for integers, booleans, objects, and functions that support operations over expressions e or faceted expressions k ? eH : eL . The implementation overloads operators on these types so that faceted values can be used interchangeably with concrete values. For instance, the Expr[ Int ] class represents the type of concrete and faceted integer expressions. We use Scala's implicit type conversions to lift concrete Scala values.
We have implemented a Scala trait that stores a runtime environment to support methods creating labels, declaring policies, and concretizing expressions. The trait maintains the logical and default constraint environments as lists of functions of type Expr[T] ⇒ Formula, where Formula is a boolean expression that may contain facets. We have a partial evaluation procedure that simplifies expressions based on the value of each facet and the current path assumptions.
To assign values to labels, the implementation evaluates policies according to the context and heap state and invokes Z3 for resolving constraints. Our implementation translates constraints to the QF_LIA logic of SMT-LIB2 [7] . There are only quantifier-free boolean constraints. Labels are the only free variables. We use incremental scripting to implement default values according to default logic [2] . The implementation relies on Scala's support for dynamic invocation to resolve field dereferences. We use zero values ( null, 0, or false ) to represent undefined fields in SMT.
Our Jeeves library interface supports the introduction of labels, declaration of policies, creation of sensitive variables, and concretization of sensitive expressions. It also has functions for assignment, conditionals, and function evaluation according to the Jeeves semantics.
The library has the following API methods for introducing sensitive values and policies: The programmer introduces labels, which are boolean logic variables mapped to HIGH and LOW, into scope by calling the mkLabel method. The restrict method for introducing policies takes a labels and a function that takes a context expression and returns a formula. The library stores policy functions and applies them with respect to the output context and output heap state to produce concrete outputs adhering to the policies. The programmer introduces sensitive values through the mkSensitive method, which takes a labels along with high-confidentiality and low-confidentiality views. To support evaluation with sensitive expressions, programs should accommodate values of type Expr[T] (e.g. IntExpr rather than BigInt). The library has methods for producing concrete state: These functions take a context and an expression, both of which may be sensitive, and provides assignments to the labels to produce concrete views that adhere to the policies. The implementation treats the mutable state as part of the context in the concretize call to ScalaSMT. All classes that are used in constraint must extend the JeevesRecord class. The set of allocated JeevesRecords is supplied at concretization. This way, policies that refer to mutable parts of the heap will produce correct constraints for the snapshot of the system at concretization. The library provides support for evaluating conditionals and function applications: The library stores the path condition as a set of labels and their negations. The jif method evaluates the condition and manages the path condition for each branch appropriately in order to produce a potentially faceted result. The jfun method behaves similarly. Both of these methods check against the path condition to avoid performing unnecessary computations.
Case Study: Conference Management
We have implemented JConf, a conference management system that uses Jeeves for confidentiality guarantees. The JConf backend interacts with a web-based frontend and a persistent database store. The original JConf implementation, written using an earlier implementation of Jeeves that used symbolic evaluation rather than faceted execution, was up for several hours at a time and a cumulative total of several days, processing submissions for the Student Research Competition for the Programming Language Design and Implementation Conference 2012. Our experience with this system motivated some of the design decisions in Jeeves, including the decision to use faceted execution.
The implementation of JConf has a backend written in Jeeves that defines Scala objects corresponding to data types (for instance, for representing users and papers) and associates policies with fields of these objects; object constructors add the policies. The backend contains functionality that supports the creation of, lookup of, updates to, and search over these objects. The frontend web code, written using the Scalatra web framework [1] , makes calls to the backend functionality and to accessors of the objects. The JConf backend contains a layer that interacts with a MySQL database for persistent storage. The frontend web code and database-interaction code remain agnostic to the policies: the same code is used, for instance, to render a page (for instance, displaying appropriately anonymized information about a paper review) for an author, a reviewer, and a program committee member. Interaction with the Jeeves backend takes on the order of seconds; solving in the Z3 SMT solver takes well under one second. The bulk of execution is involved in propagating sensitive values. The JConf conference management system provides support for creating new users and updating profiles, creating papers and updating information, submitting papers, assigning reviews, and reviewing papers. We show the breakdown of the system in Table 2 : classes describing the data (users, papers, paper reviews, and the context), backend code for accessing the data (including the interface to the database), the Scalatra code for the frontend web request handlers, and the Scalatra Server Page (SSP) code defining the browser pages themselves.
Policy code (calls to mkLabel, mkSensitive, restrict, and concretize ) is concentrated in the data classes, enabling modular updates to the policy and core functionality. For instance, we can change the review process from double-blind to single-blind simply by tweaking the policies associated with paper and review fields. The policy code makes up less than 5% of the total lines of code.
The programmer defines a getter, a setter, and a show function for each sensitive field. The getter returns the sensitive value, the setter creates a new sensitive value based on the views, and the show function calls concretize to return a concrete value of the appropriate type. The programmer creates the sensitive value with a label in scope to which policies can be attached. It may make sense to share labels between field for some applications. The frontend calls the show functions to access concrete versions of values. We use the database only for persistent storage; all queries use Jeeves to ensure policy compliance.
Related Work
Jeeves follows a line of research in language-based information flow that began with the work of Denning [15, 16] . Sabelfeld and Myers [41] survey much of the literature in the field in subsequent years. Volpano et al. [47] develop a type system that guarantees noninterference for the language that Denning outlines. Heintze and Riecke [22] design a type system guaranteeing non-interference for a functional language, extended with constructs for reference cells, concurrency, and integrity guarantees. Smith [43] discusses some of the core concepts in information flow analysis.
Languages for verifying information flow security include Jif [34] , Fine [12] , F * [45] , and Ur/Web [13] . Nanevski et al. [36] verify information flow policies through the use of dependent types. Hunt and Sands [23] describe a flow-sensitive type system. Zhang et al. [51] describe a type-based approach to mitigating timing channels. These static approaches have no dynamic overhead. Myers [34] discusses JFlow, a variant of Java with security types to provide strong information flow guarantees. Le Guernic et al. [20] examine code from branches not taken, increasing precision at the expense of run-time performance overhead. Shroff et al. [42] use a purely-dynamic analysis to track variable dependencies and reject more insecure programs over time. Jeeves mitigates programmer burden by guaranteeing that programs adhere to the desired properties by construction, but with dynamic overhead. Systems like Fabric [28] combine static and dynamic techniques, but the focus of the dynamic analyses is on checking rather than on helping the programmer produce correct outputs. Russo and Sabelfeld [40] discuss trade-offs between static and dynamic analyses.
Jeeves is also related to systems that provide support for inserting information flow checks. Broberg and Sands [9] describe flow locks for dynamic information flow policies. Birgisson et al. [8] show how capabilities can guarantee information flow policies. The system-level data flow framework Resin [49] allows the programmer to insert checking code to be executed at output channels. Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ) [30] is a capability-based system that enforces differential privacy policies in declarative database queries. SEAL [35] specifies policies for label-based access control systems.
There are parallels with dynamic approaches that run multiple executions for security guarantees. Capizzi et al.'s shadow executions [10] maintain confidentiality by running both a public and private copy of the application. The public copy can communicate with the outside world but cannot access private data; the private copy has access to private information but lacks network access. Devriese and Piessens' secure multi-execution strategy [17] applies this approach to JavaScript code. Kashyap et al. [24] discuss properties of timing and termination for secure multi-execution.
Austin and Flanagan [6] simulate secure multi-execution with a single execution through the use of faceted values, avoiding overhead when code does not depend on confidential data, noticeably improving performance. The same paper also show how declassification may be performed with facets, though with Jeeves's policies, declassification is largely unnecessary. Rozzle [27] uses symbolic execution to detect malware, treating environment-specific data as symbolic and exploring both paths whenever a value branches on a symbolic value in a manner similar to faceted evaluation. Jeeves allows more complex policies, for instance ones that may depend on sensitive values. Faceted values are related to the non-interference work by Pottier and Simonet for Core ML [38] . Their proof approach involves a Core ML 2 language that has expression pairs and value pairs, similar to faceted expressions and faceted values respectively. While their approach is not intended as a dynamic enforcement mechanism, their work does include evaluation rules for Core ML 2 that may supplement understanding of faceted values. The automatic policy enforcement is related to work in constraint functional programming and executing specifications. Like constraint functional languages, Jeeves integrates declarative constraints into a non-declarative programming model. Jeeves differs from languages such as Mercury [44] , Escher [29] , Curry [21] , and Kaplan [26] , which support rich operations over logic variables at the cost of potentially expensive runtime search and undecidability. In Jeeves, the logical environment is always consistent and the runtime only performs decidable search routines. Jeeves differs from the Squander system [31] for unified execution of imperative and declarative code in that Jeeves propagates constraints alongside the core program rather than executing isolated constraint-based subprocedures. As with relaxed approximate programs [11] , Jeeves nondeterministically provides an acceptable output for a specific class of acceptability properties.
Jeeves is related to declarative domain-specific languages. Frenetic [19] provides a query language programming distributed collections of network switches. Engage [18] uses constraints to mitigate programmer burden in configuring, installing, and managing applications. Jeeves differs in that its target domain of privacy is cross-cutting with respect to other functionality.
Declassification is an important area of research for information flow analysis and overlaps a great deal with the applications of com-putable policies. Zdancewic [50] uses integrity labels to provide robust declassification. permitting only high-integrity declassification decisions. Askarov and Myers [3] consider a similar approach for endorsement, checked endorsements. arguing that checked endorsements are needed to prevent an attacker from endorsing an unauthorized declassification. Chong and Myers [14] use a framework for application-specific declassification policies. Askarov and Sabelfeld [4] study a declassification framework specifying what and where data is released. Vaughan and Chong [46] infer declassification policies for Java programs.
The termination channel is another area of particular concern for information flow analysis. Askarov et al. [5] highlight complications of intermediary output channels, which allow an attacker to observe the output of a program during its execution, and discuss progress-sensitive noninteference. Moore et al. [32] include the concept of a budget for possible information loss through the termination channel, terminating the program when the budget has been exceeded. Rafnnson et al. [39] buffer output to reduce data lost from intermediary output channels and termination behavior.
Conclusions
Jeeves allows the programmer to implement core functionality separately from confidentiality policies. Our execution strategy exploits the structure of sensitive values to facilitate reasoning about runtime behavior. We present a semantics for faceted execution of Jeeves in terms of the λ jeeves core language, and prove non-interference and policy compliance for confidentiality. We describe how Jeeves enables reasoning about termination, policy consistency, and policy independence. Finally, we describe our implementation of Jeeves in Scala and our experience using Jeeves to implement an end-to-end conference management system. By induction q(Σ), q(ea) ⇓ pc\q q(Σ1), q(V1) q(Σ1), q(e b ) ⇓ pc\q q(Σ2), q(V ) By Lemma 3, q(Σ ′ ) = assign(q(Σ2), pc \ q, q(V1), q(V )). Therefore q(Σ), q(ea:= e b ) ⇓ pc\q q(Σ ′ ), q(V ).
• For case [F-APP] , e = (ea e b ). By the antecedents of the [F-APP] rule: Σ, ea ⇓pc Σ1, V1 Σ1, e b ⇓pc Σ2, V2 Σ2, (V1 V2) ⇓ Otherwise k ∈ q and k ∈ q. Therefore q( k ? ea : e b ) = k ? q(ea) : q(e b ) . Since k ∈ pc \ q, it holds by induction that q(Σ), k ? q(ea) : q(e b ) ⇓ pc\q q(Σ ′ ), q(V )
• Case [F-RIGHT] holds by a similar argument as [F-LEFT] .
• For case [F-SPLIT] , e = k ? ea : e b . By the antecedents of the [F-SPLIT] rule: Σ, ea ⇓ pc∪{k} Σ1, V1 Σ1, e b ⇓ pc∪{k} Σ ′ , V2 V = k ? V1 : V2 Suppose k ∈ q. Then q(e) = q(ea) and q(V1) = q(V ). By induction, q(Σ), q(ea) ⇓ pc∪{k}\q q(Σ1), q(V1). Lemma 4 implies q(Σ1) = q(Σ ′ ), so this case holds.
If k ∈ q, Then q(e) = q(e b ) and q(V2) = q(V ). By Lemma 4 we know that q(Σ) = q(Σ1). By induction, q(Σ1), q(e b ) ⇓ pc∪{k}\q q(Σ ′ ), q(V2).
If k ∈ q and k ∈ q, then by induction q(Σ), q(ea) ⇓ pc∪{k}\q q(Σ1), q(V1) q(Σ1), q(e b ) ⇓ pc∪{k}\q q(Σ ′ ), q(V2)
By Lemma 1, q(V ) = pc \ q ? q(V1) : q(V2 
